On the 18th of January 1942 the 2/29 Bn was attacked, surrounded and almost overrun by the Japanese 5th Imperial Guards Army near Muar. The survivors joined the 2/19th Bn in a withdrawal heading to Yong Peng via Parit Sulong. They put the wounded in trucks and those that could walk marched along beside the trucks with a small force out front and one protecting the rear. They fought all the way, overcoming at least five major road blocks. They fought with completely inappropriate weapons as they had been heading for the middle east before being rushed to Malaysia. Massively outnumbered and constantly attacked and taking severe casualties the force finally arrived at Parit Sulong on the 22nd January to find the Japanese in unassailable positions on the other side of the bridge. Nevertheless they attacked but were beaten back. By now they had run out of ammunition and it was apparent no relief force would or could fight through to them. They had also run out of medical supplies and had no way to look after the wounded.
Col Anderson (later awarded a VC) ordered the men to disperse, leaving the wounded behind, and try to make their way through the jungle to Yong Peng.
More than a thousand men went with the 2/29th Bn to Muar. Only 130 survived to Yong Peng.
The 150 wounded left behind at Parit Sulong were pulled out of the trucks and massacred against the wall of a nearby building by the Japanese. Amazingly three men survived even this and at least one (Lt. Hackney) was even able to survive the war. The Japanese commander was later executed for war crimes.
The 2/29th Bn received over 500 reinforcements, mostly untrained men rushed from recruiting depots in Australia. Many of these men had not been given any training or even a gun until they were on the boat headed for Singapore. The 2/29 Bn then fought in the defence of Singapore until being surrendered with the rest of the 8th Division on the 15th February.
The fight from Muar to Parit Sulong and then to Yong Peng is not well known in Australia. One of the main reasons for this is that hardly anyone survived. Another reason is that the story was perhaps subsumed in the larger story of the catastrophe at Singapore. But that fighting withdrawal by less than 2,000 men (and decreasing all the time) held up the entire 5th Guards Army for five days, a feat remarked upon by the Japanese general at the time, and a feat unsurpassed in Australian history in terms of sheer determination.
Below is a transcript of the actual intelligence summary for the 2/29th Bn from 18th to 23rd January, the pdf of the original of which is available online at http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/war_diaries/second_world_war/diary.asp?levelID=1063
This is a full transcript of the Intelligence Summary for the 2/29 Battalion from the morning of the 18th of January to the evening of the 23rd of January, 1942. To the best of my knowledge this has never been transcribed before.
As it is has been copied from a handwritten document some of the wording was very difficult to identify. My creed has been to only transcribe what I am certain is correct. When I am unsure but strongly suspect the word's identity I have put the word in [brackets]. When I have not been able to decipher the writing I have put [indec].
I am not including an index to the elisions used, nor of the military terms. Most should be pretty obvious ('Bn' means Battalion, 'A/Tk' means Anti-tank, 'Ors' means 'Other Ranks' which is Army for privates and non-commissioned officers) though some may be a little more challenging, and some I don't have the foggiest about. Perhaps just one you should know is 'B Ech' means B Echelon and was the group of trucks and carriers assigned to carry food / ammunition and medical supplies from the dump to the troops in the line. Though not mentioned in the Summary the B Ech was itself overrun and almost wiped out. I have not attempted to 'unelide' the wording for two reasons. Firstly, this is meant to be an accurate transcription. Secondly, the language used is itself evocative of the chaos of the times in which it was written.
As an extra I have also transcribed some of the other documents found in the relevant file on the Australian War Memorial website. I have done so out of pure curiosity and they may serve to help set the wider scene in which the events described in the Intelligence Summary occurred.
Later I will put some photos of some of the men who died at the end of the post.
At the last moment I have had to change some of the formatting because it wouldn't publish in columns.
The Intelligence Summary of the 2/29th Battalion, 2nd AIF, 18th to 23rd January, 1942:
18 Jan 42 BAKRI 0100
A Coy in position BAKRI xrds
0600: Weather fine. Location unchanged.
0645: 5 light tanks advanced down rd + engaged by four a / tk guns using H.E. shells without effect. Fwd gun and rear gun using H.E. shells destroyed all 5 tanks – no prisoners.
0715: 3 more tanks moved down road – 400x range – put out of action by fwd a/tk gun.
0830: C Coy came under heavy automatic fire & sustained casualties. Enemy were in position in trees + must have come up during darkness. Engaged with S.A. fire and later w/ 3" mortars.
0945: One carrier went forward to silence M.Gs but on jamming Vickers was forced to withdraw, further attempts by a gunner was successful but [firing] from trees [could not] be silenced. 2 carriers badly damaged by S M G for rest of day. [A] & C Comps patrolled well forward and were in contact with the enemy force estimated to be 2 Bns.
1000: Recce patrol detailed contact Bgde HQ – forced back at rd block approx 500 x E Bn HQ.
1100: Lt Clarke killed in effort to [indecipherable]. CO decided to get through to Bgd himself+ a D.R. took him ([pinion] riding) they reached road block – came under heavy automatic fire, both wounded. D.R. turned bike and with C.O commenced return journey. C.O. fell off bike some 50x from BHQ. Capt [Gahan] using carrier picked up C.O. but he died a few minutes after reaching HQ. Major [Olliff] assumed com'd of Bn.
1200: A Coy Comd visited by 2 i/c 2/19 Bn, late by C.O. – Col Anderson, advised 2/19 were moving into area therefore A Coy should remain 2/29 Bn. Enemy road block approx 300 x from Xrds + [indec] ordered to remove it. Attempt unsuccessful but later 2/19 carriers with approx 2 sections A Coy succeeded in removing barrier. A Coy moved fwd astride rd + were forced to ground on right of road slightly fwd of where road block had been. Movement on left stopped by automatic + mortar fire – casualties 1 killed 10 wounded. 2/19 Bn mortars silenced enemy while Coy from 2/19 moved fwd on right + took up position. A Coy then moved fwd + rejoined Bn 1700 hrs.
1700: A Coy took up former position right rear.
1600 - 1700: Recce patrol under Lt McQueen went out to contact 2/19 Bn – returned after having made contact.
1800: 3 vehicles from B Echelon carrying ammn + food also 1 wireless van AASC [indec] vehicles from 2/15 [Fld Regt][indec] MACNEIL who had come up with ration truck officiate at burial of C.O., Lt Clarke + 3 Ors.
1930: Reports from C Coy that enemy force approx 100 armed with automatic weapons were preventing 18 PL from withdrawing to night perimeter positions.
Enemy force withdraws.
2000: Enemy approx 100 strong attacks 15 PL with bayonets + grenades but were driven off. 10 minutes later probably the same force attacked 14 PL when practically all enemy were [indec] off + high percentage killed – own cas 1 killed 5 wounded.
2200: A Coy ordered [indec] patrol [indec] to contact Bgde HQ. This patrol did not return Bn but subsequently was learned personnel were fighting (with) 2/19 Bn. Enemy air activity during day restricted to frequent aerial recces.
Patrolling. Patrols operated throughout night without contacting enemy.
19 Jan BAKRI
0600: Weather fine. Location unchanged.
0930: 2 scouts sent out to contact 2/19 Bn failed to do so.
1130: B.M. arrived Bn HQ + advised Bde HQ heavily bombed. He asked for a section to accompany him in an endeavour 2Bn of JATS who were reported to be on our right flank.
1330: JATS commenced to pass through our position to link up with 2/19 Bn. In movement back they encountered heavy enemy fire and considerable numbers returned to our perimeter. Attempts made to organise them
1400: Dive bomber dropped bomb vicinity BHQ no casualties
1430: B Ech moved to CORONATION [indec] KLUANG. Bombed and machine gunned from air.
1530: Enemy Arty shelled A Coy area. JATS suffered heavily and in their attempts to escape shelling crossed road between C + HQ Coys. Arty then shifted to W side of road + C Coy sustained come casualties whilst JATS suffered further heavy losses.
1630: Shelling lifted. Under mortar fire. Attack launched on B + C Coys – on B Coy front enemy attack defeated with heavy casualties. On C Coy front heavy mortar and automatic fire drove 1 PL back 50 x. C Coy counter attacked + drove enemy off for a distance 600 – 800 x.
1750: All enemy accounted for + C Coy Com'd reported positions on both fronts to C.O. Enemy shells identified as 5.9 inch.
1735: C.O.'s conference information given that 2/19 Bn had been trying to link up with us all day unsuccessfully. The Bn was now ordered to cut its way back to 2/19 Bn travelling east side of road. Order of march. A BHQ, HQ Coy, C + B Coys moving at 10 minute [intervals].
Transport to move 1815 hrs.
1815: Maj Olliff, C.O. was killed by enemy automatic fire.
A Coy which left at 1800 hrs whilst crossing open ground 300 x rear of original position came under heavy M.G. fire. Capt McNAUGHTON + Ly. CALVERT were killed + several Ors killed + wounded. O.C. + part of Coy became detached from main body. H.Q. Coy + B.H.Q. [going/arriving] further E to skirt open ground + became entangled in a swamp forcing them further E still. Lt SHELDON killed. C Coy detached 13 PL under Capt WEST to attempt to flank enemy position + clear road for transport but were unsuccessful. [This] PL [then] followed route taken by HQ Coy. B Coy followed main body of H.Q. Coy + reached 2/19 Bn without further casualties.
1930: Capt. MORGAN [indec] gathered parties which had [indec] E and formed a body consisting of 7 officers + 150 Ors – set off across country in direction of YONG PENG.
O.C. B Coy Capt MAHER assumed Com'd 2/29 Bn consisted of B Coy (3 Officers 100 Ors) C. Coy (3 Officers 45 Ors) A Coy (45 Ors) whilst organising this force at BAKRI Xrds it came under heavy M.G. fire. No casualties. The force moved inside 2/19 Bn perimeter + bedded down for night. 5 Carriers + 2 a/tk guns acting as rear guard remained in position until B Coy were clear of area.
1930: A/tk guns demobilised 2 Carriers attempted to get past road block one being successful in getting around it the other being abandoned. Other 3 Carriers demobilised. Crews together with R.M.O., 6 walking wounded + a/tk personnel moved N. And following night linked up with 2/19 Bn.
20 Jan BAKRI
Weather fine. Location – within 2/19 Bn perimeter.
0600: C.O. 2/19 Bn issued orders for withdrawal. A + C Coys organised as 2 PLs joined D Coy 2/19 Bn moving out left of formation. B Coy acted as rear guard. Start time 0730 hrs.
0900: Enemy M.G. position on right rd held up movement approx 1 hr finally silenced by attack under personal leadership of Lt. Col ANDERSON.
1200: Strong road block on road with M.Gs on road block also both sides of road – leading Coys pinned and unable to move.
1330: Lt. COOTES with remains of C Coy less Coy HQ ordered to make way across swamp on left + through jungle to attack on flank of left M.G. position to support frontal attack by remainder D + C Coys 2/19 Bn.
1415: 18 PL 2/19 Bn sent by same route as Lt. COOTES, as nothing had been heard of his party.
1500: Fire commenced on left of enemy later identified as that of 18 PL + frontal attack commenced with our A Coy in lead.
1530: Lt CARR Com'd A Coy when 100 yards from enemy guns was ordered by 2 i/c of 2/19 Bn to charge position. Leading his men he was killed + very heavy automatic fire forced remainder to withdraw.
1630: Fire heard from rear of enemy position turned out to be from LT COOTE's force.
Knowing strength of enemy he was ordered to withdraw and was not seen again.
1730: Fresh frontal attack by C Coy 2/19 Bn on right and A Coy 2/29 left supported by mortars + Carriers. 2/29 personnel reached point approx 50 x enemy position but C Coy 2/19 and Carriers were pinned 200 x short of objective.
1900: Withdrawal of 2/29 Bn personnel ordered by D Coy Com'd 2/19 Bn. Carried out without loss after 2 enemy MG put out of action with grenades.
1930: C Coy 2/19 Bn attacked on right of road and drove them out. Then B Coy 2/29 went through whole enemy position with bayonet and cleared out any remaining enemy. Road block cleared with axes. Stopped 2000 hrs. B Ech endeavoured to get rations through but failed.
21 Jan PARIT SULONG
0600: Weather fine. Location 4 miles E. PARIT SULONG.
D.R. had reported that PARIT SULONG Brdge had sandbagged barrier manned by either Malay or Japanese troops.
0730: Column reaches road running N to KAN KAR
Recce observed bridge held by enemy. 50 men from 2/29 Bn detailed to assist in attack on bridge but returned to rear guard when attack on rear started.
0800: Remainder 2/29 Bn acted as rear guard. Capt MAHER right Capt BOWRING left. 1 25 Pdr placed on position at [indec] corner when enemy attack developed from rear – some casualties in Arty + own personnel. Main attack came through scrub on left of road but was driven off by party from 2/29 Bn and Indians [indec].
New line formed 400 x E of KANKAR Xrds.
[1000]: 3 enemy heavy tanks penetrated Xrds – 2 put out of action by Arty + one disabled by fire from A/TK rifle. [Indec] remainder of day several small attacks beaten off on 2/29 front while attempts were made by 2/19 Bn to clear bridge. Sporadic shelling all day.
1630: R.M.O. 2/19 Bn suggested to Com'd 2/19 Bn that wounded should be placed on trucks + moved to rd block in case Japs would allow them through. Approx 15 badly wounded cases placed on 1 Amb + 1 [indec] vehicle. Jap Com'd refused to allow them through unless there was a complete surrender of the force. Vehicles retained as extra road block but during night drivers released brakes and vehicles reached our lines.
1800: Capt LOVETT and 7 Ors wounded by shell fire.
1930: 3 tanks penetrated to Xrds + opened fire. Under this fire several enemy with automatics advanced toward position. 1 sgt manned the gun at the road at rear of position + drove off tanks.
2030: 5 more tanks advanced along road one of them reaching a point only 50 x ahead of 25 pdr. An A.P. shell failed to [indec] the first tank but when HE used tank blown to pieces. Shells disabled at least 2 more tanks.
2100 – 2200: Capt MAHER wounded by [indec] + moved to R.A.P....killed when shell blew up car in which he had been placed.
B Ech CORONATION [indec] near KLUANG. All men essential transport moved to special pool.
22nd Jan PARIT SULONG
0600: Weather fine. Location unchanged.
0630: Enemy Arty, mortars and MG fire brought down on position. Fire returned by our own mortars – shelling continued all morning.
0800: 3 of our aircraft dropped containers of food and medical supplies, latter especially needed as stocks of morphia exhausted.
0830: 5 enemy tanks came through rubber on right of road to within 50 x of our position. C.O. 2/19 Bn decision to break contact and withdraw.
0930: C.O. orders to withdraw by Coys moving approx 2 miles N then E to YONG PENG. Walking wounded accompanied main party, balance wounded had to be left. Amb made further attempt to get through but came under heavy fire + forced into river. Whole force crosses river during day + spends night in swamps near SRI MEDAH. B Ech – KLUANG but could not make contact with Bn.
1700 23rd Jan YONG PENG
Weather fine. Party started to arrive at YONG PENG. Move by MT to B Ech after reporting to Bde HQ. Other parties moved direct to GBD JOHORE BAHRU. B Ech moved to 45 ¼ mile peg JOHORE BAHRU. Hot boxes rations + cigarette left in charge of 2/30 Bn about 2 miles from YONG PENG. [Indec] has continued through
1800: B Ech fed 192 2/19 Bn, 25 2/15 Fd Regt, 58 2/29 Bn, 1 8 Div Sigs. Nearly all troops refitted as D.A.D.O.S.
2130: Last party reached YONG PENG.
Next day the total strength of 2/29 Bn had reached 130 men.
Other documents from the file at AWM:
HQ 27 Aust Inf Bde SECRET
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED UP TO 2100 hrs 2 DEC 41
ENEMY:
Troop movements: Continues Japanese activity SAIGONG – HAIPHONG (?) incl arrival 5 Div. This Div is experienced in Beach landings.
AIR ACTIVITY:
Steady increase JAPANESE Fighter and bomber squadron F I C during past month.
OWN TPS:
Field defences: Anti-personnel mines are being laid in certain [this 'certain' is handwritten above a crosses out 'Central'] Coastal Area.
SEDILI BOOM: Engrs closing boom. Arrangements will probably be made for river craft to pass at certain periods of the day.
Impressment of river craft: Action is being taken to obtain necessary craft for ENDAU, vessels being hired only.
Air activity: Continued recce seaward.
SIGNATURES HERE
2/29 Bn AIF
MALAYA
2
DEC '41
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES
ROUTINE ORDERS BY LT-COL J C ROBERSTON, NC, VD.
DUTIES. Duty Coy Mounting RETREAT 2 DEC '41 HQ Coy
Next for duty " " 3 " C Coy
Orderly Officer " " 2 " Lieut N J GANAN (?)
Next for duty " " 3 " Lieut N B SMITH (?)
- UNION JACK CLUN. SINGAPORE. Attention is drawn to the fact that the Union Jack Club, SINGAPORE, is NOT open to Officers.
DRESS. Several cases have been noticed of AIF personnel without shirts driving vehicles in public places, including SINGAPORE.
Instructions have been issued that such disregard of regulations as to dress will result in the offenders being immediately charged with disobedience of orders as to dress.
SIGNATURE HERE
NOTICE.
A.C.F Comforts. Cigarette papers were not included in issue for the month of Novembers as no stocks were available.
Lost, 1 set of Identification discs, marked VX 37335 PROSSER F. Finder please return to BN HQ.
2/29 Bn AIF
MALAYA
3rd December ' 41
SCALE OF KIT TO BE CARRIED BY OR's FOR MOVE OPERATIONAL STATION
| On person or in haversack | In pack on truck | Total |
Hat
Shirt
Shorts T/U
Vests
Underpants
Socks
Hose Tops
Puttees
Boots
Laces spare
Identity discs
Field Dressing
Knives clasp
Rifle and Bayonet (or Pistol) & amn
Respirator, cotton waste, eyeshields, & ointment
Set of web equipment
Anit-malarial cream
Knife, fork and spoon
Mess tin
Emergency ration
Ration bag
Torch
Toilet kit
Towels
Water proof cape (AUSTRALIAN ISSUE)
Canvas shoes
Mug
Pay book
Housewife
Writing material | 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- | -
5
4
2
1
5
1
-
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
| 1
6
5
3
2
6
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1 |
On truck – Helmet stool, or as ordered
Blanker
Net & rods
Ground sheet
SECRET
WEPI
21 DEC '41
MAIN FEATURES OF ENEMY TACTICS.
The main features of enemy tactics so far have been as follows:-
- Simple verbal orders for attack on definite objectives. Great powers of endurance and no type of ground can be considered an obstacle. E.g., Creeks and small rivers are crossed by means of inflated rubber belts. Advance through jungle by Company columns precede by patrols which find flanks and infiltrate and HQ staff assemble in rear.
- Attack by formed bodies pressed with great determination in defence, forward patrols go to ground allowing attack to pass through, then open fire on rear. Small bore ammunition inflicts minor wounds. Grenades are not as effective as ours and mortar ammunition has no blast effect. Considerable use made of small tanks which can traverse rubber with infantry penetrating.
- Enemy tactics calculated to defeat static or linear defence and has considerable moral effect on troops taking enemy in rear. Best answer is systems of posts each self contained and with all round defence acting as pivots of manoeuvre for aggressive reserve.
The above is extract of KATI message 0 857 of 20 Dec '41
SIGNATURE HERE
SECRET 2/29 Bn A.I.F
No 69 H E GRENADE
- The No 69 Grenade is a HE grenade for use against AFVs, transport or any other type of mechanization. It is a percussion type, i.e. it explodes on impact and has a very powerful local destructive ability. This grenade is essentially and anit AFV weapon and must not be used as anit personnel.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
- Lenght – approx 4 ½ inches
- Diameter – approx 2 ½ inches
- Weight – approx 3 / 4 lb
- Type – percussion HE
- The grenade consists of a barrel shaped black baelite casing with the usual HE markings, with a cylindrical shaped cap on the top containing the firing mechanism.
- The no 69 HE grenade is packed in tinned boxes containing 34 grenades, and two containers each holding 18 detonators.
SAFETY PRECAUTIONS – The following inspection must always be carried out before handling the grenade: -
- Remove base plug to see that the grenade is not primed.
- Remove safety cap and ensure that the safety pin and tape are in position.
- MECHANISM – The grenade functions in the following manner: - During flight, the weight on the safety tape drags the tape from the grenade, thus removing the safety pin. On impact, the shock forces the firing ball on to the face of the striker, which moves down into the striker guide there compressing the striker spring. The nipples on the striker contact the firing cap which explodes, the flash passes into the open end of the detonator which then explodes and in turn, fires the HE in the outer casing.
- EMPLOYMENT – As indicated in para 1 above the grenade is for use against AFVs against which it is very effective. It should not under any circumstances be used against personnel excepting in an emergency and when no other effective weapon is available, as no effect can be expected from fragmentation and unless a very vulnerable target is offered, very [few / little (?)] casualties would result from concussion. The grenade should be thrown into the tracks of AFVs to damage the tracks or driving sprocket or if possible, into the interior of the vehicle to damage the internal mechanism or engine. It may also be used with effect by throwing at any openings such as visors for driver or gunner.
- PRIMING – The method of priming is as follows:- First carry out the safety precautions detailed in para 3 above. Ensure that the safety pin is in position with the tape correctly wound, then replace safety cap. Insert detonator open end first, into the bottom of the grenade and replace base plug. Detonators must be handled by the open end only and should not be left in the sun. They are extremely sensitive to heat and may be ignited by the heat of the hand with adverse results to the person concerned.
- THROWING – First ensure that the grenade is primed. Then remove the safety cap and ensure that the safety pin and tape are in position. For throwing, adopt the normal stance, with the grenade held in the hand WITH THE THUMB ON THE WEIGHT OF THE SAFETY TAPE. The grenade may then be thrown in and normal overarm manner, with force, at the target, the tape and safety pin falling off during flight. It is important that the safety pin and tape are in position during the throwing motion for is this is neglected the action of the throw may cause the grenade to explode in the hand of the thrower.
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCER 27 DEC '41
ROUTINE ORDERS BY [INDECIPHERABLE] I Comd
PART 1 No 256
- MEDICAL AND HYGIENE. Too much stress cannot be laid on the viligant [sic] maintonance [sic] of all medical, hygiene and danitary measures. Attention is drawn ro ADMS Circular 39 of 21 DEC '41 as well as regulation laid down in ASO, and previous Medical instns. Observance of these provisions is in all respects as vital as operational measures.
- OBSERVATION OF ORDERS. Attention is drawn to the necessity for all ranks adhering to orders given and paying no attention to rumours coming from unauthorised sources that orders have been varied. An illustration is the spread of a rumour that regulations relating to brownout driving conditions have been changed,
- TRAFFIC CONTROL. All MT and Carriers crossing wooden bridges will reduce speed to fifteen (15) m.p.h. Speeding loosens bridge spikes and no maintenance is available.
- SALVAGE AND TRT GENERALLY. No vehicle will move unloaded unless no loads are available. Salvage will always be loaded if available. MT may move to SINGAPORE to purchase supplementary rations and canteen stores. Such vehicles must carry loads and must proceed in convoy. Permission must be obtained before vehicles move, and one Causeway pass will be issued for the convoy.
- CAUSEWAY. All military MT crossing from JB must obtain a pass from GANU
- CARE OF MT. The tendency to speed up must be curbed. Replacement repair and spare parts are increasingly difficult. This must be impressed on all ranks. Motor cyclists particularly are riding at excessive speeds.
CHURCH SERVICES, SUNDAY 28 DEC ' 41
Combined
M.T. All drivers are to be warned that vehicles must NOT be driven on the field of the Aerodrome unless extreme emergency exists.
SIGNATURE HERE
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES 30 DEC 41
ROUTING ORDERS BY JIXA COMD
2" MORTAR. Numerous reports have been received of broken firing pins. These may be caused by the following error in operation:-
The Mortar is fitted with a firing handle which should not be pressed until the bomb is at rest. Gunners have been observed holding the firing handle so that the firing pin protrudes during loading, and firing is then similar in operation to that of the 3" Mortar. This must NOT be done. The bomb must NOT be allowed to fall onto the firing pin.
As the cause of the trouble has not yet been accurately diagnosed Units are requested to examine carefully every broken firing pin and call upon the services of the OME for investigation.
Is there any tendency for the firing pin to jamb?
If the "Spring, firing pin" is enlarged at one end, the enlarged coil is to be inserted towards the muzzle.
DISPOSAL OF TOTAL CASUALTIES. In the event of fatal casualties the following action will be taken as soon as practicable after the occurrence :-
- BN HQ will be immediately informed and W3011 rendered.
- Paybook, red identity disc, cash and all other articles of a personal nature will be removed from the body, an inventory made out, and forwarded to Bn HQ.
All items of clothing and equipment will be collected, and inventory made, and forwarded to QM who will dispose of these as follows :-
- Arms and equipment will be disposed of in the usual manner.
- Issue clothing will be treated as salvage.
- Items of personal clothing will be forwarded to 2 Ech.
- At Bn HQ, paybook and cash will be handed to Pay Sgt who will make necessary entries in paybook and forward both paybook and cash to 8 Div Fd Cash Office.
- Red identity disc and all other personal articles likely to be of a sentimental value will be forwarded by registered DR to 2 Ech (accompanied by inventory) from whence it is sent to Next of Kin.
- W3314 is rendered by Bn HQ, 1 copy to Assistant Chaplain General and 1 copy to 2 Ech.
EVACUATIONS TO HOSPITAL. Attention is again directed to the necessity of carrying out the correct procedure in regard to personnel who are evacuated to hospital. In spite of frequent instns obvious carelessness still occurs in some evacuations. It is the responsibility of the Coy concerned to ensure that when men leave their sub unit they are in possession of Paybook, F200, WF140, B122, Dental Card (if available), identification discs, steel helmet, rifle and equipment and ALL other belongings. It is the responsibility of the RMO to see that personnel are in possession of the correct documents, equipment and all personal gear. The evacuation is to be reported to Bn Hq by the RAP, and by the Coy on W3011.
SIGNATURE HERE
